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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/STATUTES 
No constitutional provisions need be considered for 
olution of this case. The statutory provisions involved 
Utah Judicial Code 78-45-7(2): 
"When no prior court order exists, or a material change 
in circumstances has occurred, the court, in determining 
the amount of prospective support, shall consider all the 
relevant factors including but not limited to: 
(a) The standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the ages of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others." 
Utah Judicial Code 78-45-7(4): 
"In determining the amount of prospective support on an 
ex parte or other motion for temporary support, the court 
shall use a uniform statewide assessment formula, 
adjusted for regional differences prior to rendering the 
support order. The formula shall provide for all 
relevant which can be readily identified and shall allow 
for reasonable deductions from the obligor's earnings for 
taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. The 
assessment formula shall be established by the Department 
of Social Services and periodically reviewed by the 
Judicial Council under subsection 78-3-21(3)." 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a): 
"Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court 
determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall 
award just damages and single or double costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party." 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and Jurisdiction 
to pursue this Appeal is granted under Article 8 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and Sections 78-2-2(3) (I) 
and 78-2a-3 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 
3, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order of Modification of a 
Decree of Divorce which was signed by the Honorable David 
Young, Judge of the Third District Court, on February 2, 1988. 
The Order was entered after a trial held on the 16th day of 
December, 1987. On December 23, 1987 the Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision. (Copy of the Order and Memorandum 
Decision attached as part of the Addendum herein) Pursuant to 
the Memorandum Decision and the Order of Modification the 
Trial Court found there had been a substantial change of 
circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and 
increased the child support for the two remaining minor 
children residing with the Plaintiff to $200.00 per month per 
child, an increase of $125.00 per month per child from the 
original decree. Additionally, the Court declined to modify 
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the Decree of Divorce to award the Plaintiff anything from 
Defendant's retirement account, and an award of attorneys' 
fees in the amount of $250.00 was ordered. 
Ill 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in the 
amount of the award of increase for child support pursuant to 
a petition for Modification of a Decree of Divorce? 
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in failing 
to award the Plaintiff an interest in Defendant's retirement 
program benefits, which had not been distributed pursuant to 
the oriqinal Decree of Divorce? 
3. Is Plaintiff entitled to an award of attorneys' fees 
to pursue this Appeal? 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: 
P1aintiff/Appel1 ant petitioned the Court for a 
modification of her Decree of Divorce on August 18, 1987. The 
parties to this action were granted a Decree of Divorce on 
September 27, 1978 after an eighteen (18) year marriage. 
There were seven children born of this marriage. Defendant 
was granted custody of the three oldest children and Plaintiff 
was granted custody of the four youngest. Defendant was 
ordered to pay child support in the amount of $75.00 per month 
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for each of the four youngest children, Plaintiff was under no 
duty of support for the children in the Defendants custody. 
Defendant was further ordered to maintain health and accident 
insurance coverage for the children. The Decree of Divorce 
distributed all property, both real and personal owned by the 
parties at the time of the Divorce. 
Since the entry of the Decree the parties four oldest 
children have reached the age of majority. Defendant has no 
minor children from this marriage in his custody; however, the 
parties 17 year old daughter, who is in the Plaintiff's 
custody, has elected to live with a friend and her parents and 
Defendant continues to pay child support to that family on her 
behalf. The Plaintiff has the parties two youngest sons in 
her custody and her petition for Modification requested an 
increase in the child support award, and a distribution of a 
purported retirement benefit not distributed pursuant to the 
original Decree of Divorce. 
Defendant was not in arrearage under the Order of 
support, and had, approximately one year prior to the filing 
of the petition for Modification, voluntarily increased his 
support payment for the three youngest children to $110.00 per 
month per child. 
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b. Course of proceedings: 
By Stipulation the parties to this action agreed that 
there were sufficient substantial changes in circumstances to 
warrant the Courts review and entry of an order of 
modification. The changes included a significant increase in 
the Defendant's income, his remarriage, and the Plaintiff 
suffering from a condition identified as spastic disphonia 
which leaves her unable to speak above a whisper. Plaintiff 
at the time of the filing of the petition was unemployed and 
receiving AFDC payments and a grant through the State of Utah 
which will allow her to complete a schooling program. 
A trial was held on the Petition for Modification on the 
16th day of December, 1987. The parties and their counsel 
were present and Mr. Dan Larsen representing the State of Utah 
appeared in this matter. Mr. Larsen, upon acknowledging that 
the State's interest was satisfied with the amount that Mr. 
Ostler was currently paying, was excused. After motion by 
Defendant's counsel and discussion between counsel and the 
Bench it was agreed that the matter would be heard on the 
basis of a proffer from counsel because of the difficulty of 
Plaintiff's speech problem and the use of an interpreter. 
Both counsel made proffer of the testimony that their 
clients would have presented on the issues before the Court, 
the parties were sworn and acknowledged the proffers, and the 
matter was taken under advisement. On December 23, 1987 Judge 
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David Young issued a Memorandum Decision and Findings were 
prepared and an Order submitted which was executed on February 
2, 1988. 
c. Disposition at trial Court: 
Judge David Young, based of the evidence proffered at the 
time of trial, issued a memorandum decision and Findings based 
thereon were entered. The Findings were First, that the 
Decree of Divorce should be modified to increase the 
Defendant's child support from $75.00 per month per child to 
$200.00 per month per child for his remaining minor children. 
The child support payment was to continue until the children 
graduated from high school. Secondly, the Court found that 
the Defendant did not have a vested retirement account at the 
time of the entry of the original Decree of Divorce and that 
Defendant's payments on behalf of his children were 
sufficiently in excess of his legal obligation to have 
compensated the Plaintiff for any nominal amount that she may 
have lost at the time of the Divorce on her claim to a share 
of the retirement account. Additionally, the Court awarded 
the Plaintiff $250.00 in attorney's fees in this matter. 
d • Relevant facts with citations to the record: 
Based on the Financial Declaration of the Defendant, the 
proffer of counsel, fully acknowledged by Defendant in open 
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court, and the Income tax figures presented at the time of 
trial it appears that the Defendant's adjusted gross income is 
approximately $3,300.00 per month. The Plaintiff's counsel 
has indicated that Defendant has a monthly gross income of 
$4,372.00 which, although indicated on his Financial 
Declaration form does not take into account adjustments to his 
monthly gross that result in the actual figures which were 
considered by Judge Young in making his decision in this 
matter . 
At the time Judge Young entered his Order on the increase 
in child support he had the information before him that had 
been submitted at the pre-trial and the trial. That 
information included, Defendant's 1986 Income tax figures, his 
Financial Declaration form and his testimony submitted through 
proffer of counsel. Additionally, both counsel submitted the 
currently used schedule showing child support guidelines which 
were used on an advisory basis by the Commissioner and Judges 
of the Third District. (See ex.E, attached to Appellants 
addendum) 
Based on the undisputed facts, which have been 
acknowledged by both counsel, Defendant/Respondent at the time 
of this hearing was responsible for the support of at least 
three children who were still attending school below the 
college level. The support payable, according to the schedule 
submitted at the time of trial, for three children at the 
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Defendants income level would be $203.00-$209.00, per child. 
He also provides all health care, orthodontic care and 
insurances on his children. 
It is further undisputed that the Defendant has 
remarried. He has one child as a result of this marriage, and 
he helps to provide support for step-children and for his 
adult children from his prior marriage who need assistance to 
complete their schooling programs. 
Appellant alleges that the Trial Court found that 
Plaintiff had no interest in Defendant's retirement account 
because of child support payments that he had made over the 
level required under the Decree of Divorce. That appears to 
be an oversimplification of the actual Findings rendered by 
Judge Young. In that regard the Judge specifically found that 
at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce the 
Defendant's retirement account had not vested. Further, he 
found that vesting occurred after the entry of the Decree and 
that the amount at that time was nominal. The Judge then 
found that the Defendant had made support payments over his 
legal obligations and that had more than compensated Plaintiff 
for the nominal amount of the then-existing retirement 
account. It is undisputed, irrespective of Counsel's 
confusion, that the Sperry-Univac retirement program exhibit 
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( Ex. H of Plaintiff's Addendum) shows a total "estimated 
accumulation" in the Defendant's retirement account, in April 
of 1979 of $1 ,338.22. 
V 
ARGUMENT 
Of the issues presented only one can arguably be given 
much weight. For purpose of Defendant/Respondent ' s position 
we will deal first with the issue of the requested 
modification of the Decree to distribute a portion of a 
purported retirement program benefit. While Defendant does 
not question the right of the courts to distribute, incident 
to the entry of a Decree, retirement program benefits as 
provided in Dogu vs . Dogu , 652 P2d 1308 and Wo odwar d vs . 
Woodward, 656 P2d 431, he does contend that the case does not 
meet the standards indicated in those decisions. 
Inasmuch as there appears to be no specific language in 
the underlying Decree of Divorce regarding distribution of a 
retirement program benefit, certain standards must be met 
before a Modification of a Decree may be ordered. The 
threshold imposed to seek any modification must be a showing 
of a substantial change of circumstances, (See Ad ams vs. 
Adams, 539 P2d 147 (1979), Haslam vs. Haslam, 657 P2d 757 
(1982))and although the parties here stipulated that 
sufficient substantial change of circumstances had occurred 
to warrant reconsideration of the support issue there is no 
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stipulation to overturn the plain language of the Decree on 
the retirement issue. In this Divorce the parties were both 
represented by counsel and the Decree was entered based upon 
the Stipulation of the parties. All issues presented, 
including distribution of real property, personal property, 
custody, support of children, and alimony were covered by the 
Stipluation and Decree. The Supreme Court established the 
parameters to be followed in modifying the property provisions 
of an existing Decree in the case of Land vs. Land, 605 P2d 
1248. In that case the Supreme Court held that: 
"...When a decree is based upon a property 
settlement agreement, forged by the parties and 
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such 
agreement into consideration. Equity is not 
available to reinstate rights and privileges 
voluntarily contracted away simply because one has 
come to regret the bargain made. Accordingly, the 
law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
where a property settlement agreement has been 
incorporated into the decree, and the out right 
abrogation of the provisions of such an agreement is 
only to be resorted to with great reluctance and for 
compelling r e a s o n s / ("underlying for emphasis) 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently confirmed that 
concept in the case of Porco vs . Porco, 752 P2d 365; 79 Adv 
Rep. 35, when it held that: 
"Ten years after the entry of the original divorce 
decree, plaintiff requests that this court 
redistribute certain items of personal property. 
Plaintiff has failed to show any substantive change 
of circumstance concerning the distribution of 
property and in the absence of such a showing, the 
decree shall not be modified and the matters 
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previously litigated and incorporated therein cannot 
be collaterally attacked in face of the doctrine of 
res judicata." 
The Plaintiff/Appellant has failed to show or demonstrate 
any compelling reason to amend the property distribution and 
indeed none appears to exist. In this case, 
Defendant/Respondent was employed for a little over 9 years at 
Sperry-Univac. This employment occurred durinq the last half 
of the parties 18 year marriage. According to the Employee 
Benefits Sheet (Part of Ex. H attached to the 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Addendum) and submitted to the trial 
Court Mr. Ostler had at April 1979, eight months after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce, a total of $1,338.22 in the 
retirement program. The program had a ten year vesting 
requirement and the statement shows that no contribution had 
been made for 1977 or 1978 and by proffer it was accepted that 
no contribution by the employee or employer were made to the 
plan prior to these parties1 Divorce. 
The Findings made by the Court and the evidence submitted 
are reasonable and no abuse of discretion appears evident from 
the facts presented. Plaintiff argues that the case of 
Thompson vs. Thompson, 709 P2d 360, (1985), would allow her to 
collaterally attack the Decree and now require distribution of 
a retirement benefit where there was no vesting and no 
contribution of any kind by the Defendant or the company at 
the time the Decree was entered. The Thompson case, supra, 
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has no rational application to our facts. In that case, an 
auto loan, outstanding and the time of the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce, was not allocated by the terms of the Decree, and 
the Supreme Court held that the Defendant, after assuming 
responsibility thereon, making certain payments, and having 
stopped those payments to the plaintiff's detriment, that a 
modification to include the loan in the Decree was 
appropr iate. 
If there is an indication of fraud, or deception as to a 
substantial asset and one party withholds information to 
another, then the court may have the compelling circumstances 
necessary to consider this type of modification, but no such 
indication appears from the record or the facts in this 
matter• 
On the issue of child support, Defendant acknowledges 
that the factors, once the threshold of a substantial change 
of circumstances has been met, to be considered are set out in 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, §78-45-7(2) which 
prov ides: 
"When no prior court order exists, or material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the court, in 
determining the amount of prospective support, shall 
consider all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
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(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the ages of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others." 
The record submitted on appeal would show that the court 
considered many items in making its decision in this matter. 
The court held, prior to issuing its Memorandum Decision, the 
complete Financial Declaration Forms of the parties, (See Ex. 
G & H of Appellants Addendum) it had the proffers of counsel 
regarding the Plaintiff/Appellants circumstances, (Transcript 
pages 7 thru 12) and the most current available support 
schedule being used by the Commissioner and the courts as an 
aid in determining support amounts (See Ex. E of the 
Plaintiff/Appellants Addendum, Defendant denies that Ex F, the 
purported Child Support Obligation Worksheet was submitted at 
the time of trial or used as an exhibit in the lower court). 
The court also had a proffer as to Defendant/Respondent's 
current circumstances as set out in the Transcript at pages 16 
through 24. 
This information included all of the points covered under 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7(2) as set out above. Obviously, 
Defendant does not have, as his only obligation, the support 
of his two youngest sons, he is providing support for his 
youngest daughter, who although in Plaintiff's custody, has 
elected to live with another family, he has a child from his 
current marriage and provides assistance to his other children 
- 13 -
and step children for schooling and mission purposes. We are 
not dealing in this action with an issue of temporary or 
prospective support as alleged under § 7 8 - 4 5 - 7 ( 4 ) . We are 
dealing with an increase, of a permanent award on a 
modification basis, and the court has ordered an eighty-two 
percent (82%) increase in the level of support which was being 
paid from $110.00 per month to $200.00 per month and that was 
made after Defendant had voluntarily, at the State's request, 
increased his support from $75.00 per month as required under 
the Decree to $110.00 per month per child, the total increase 
over a year is 167?o of the original award. 
In the case of Martinez vs. Martinez, 754 P2d 69 (1988), 
a recent landmark decision this court in an appeal on an 
issue of child support made a determination in favor of an 
appel 1 ant/wi fe who had received an award of $300.00 per month 
per child for three children. The Court of Appeals, 
considering the record and the original Decree was convinced 
that the trial Court had clearly abused its discretion. Based 
on the finding that the Defendant/Respondent had an income of 
$100,000.00 per year, and that he had no other responsibility 
but the support of himself, his children and his ex-spouse the 
Court of Appeals in an unusual direct order increased the 
child support payment required from $300.00 to $600.00 per 
month per child. 
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A comparison of the facts is interesting in this case and 
the Martinez case (supra). In Martinez the Defendant's gross 
income was $100,000.00 per year or $8,333.00 per month in the 
instant case Defendant has a gross income (according to his 
1986 income tax figures) of $43,000.00 per year adjusted for 
loss on real property by $3,600.00 would be $39,400.00 or 
approximately $3,283.00 a month as his adjusted gross income. 
Both cases show a need to support three children who are still 
in school, although in the instant case Defendant also has a 
new family including one daughter and assists in the payment 
of support on his other children for schooling and missions. 
The percentage of gross monthly income awarded in Martinez 
(supra) for child support is approximately 22% in the instant 
case assuming a level of support at $200.00 per month for the 
three minor children, the percentage is 18%. The Court of 
Appeals in Martinez noted, as is the case here, that the court 
did not fully address all child support factors in its 
findings but held that such was not reversible error because 
of the information which was presented. In the case at hand 
there is not a clear abuse of discretion and the trial court 
having conducted the pre-trial on the matter, having heard the 
matter at trial and having prepared a Memorandum Decision does 
not appear to have wrongly assessed the parties capacities or 
needs. The court must take many facts into consideration in 
arriving at its decision, facts which include in the case, 
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that Defendant provides all health and medical care coverage 
on the children, that Defendant has met and continues to pay 
for orthodontic and dental care for the children, that 
Defendant spends time with and provides clothing and other 
benefits which do not become a part of any record. 
There is no evidence that Judge Young has abused his 
discretion in this matter. He has ordered a modification 
which substantially increases the level of child support and 
he has correctly determined that no claim exists for the 
Plaintiff against a non-vested retirement program which 
contained at the time of the Divorce no employee or company 
contr ibutions. 
Finally, the issue of attorneys1 fees has been raised in 
the Plaintiff's appeal and must be addressed. Judge Young, 
awarded $250.00 to Plaintiff incident to the District Court 
action and there appears to be no allegation presented in the 
appeal which challenges either the amount or sufficiency of 
that award. Defendant does not contest that award and would 
ask only that the court uphold the award, without 
modi fication. 
Plaintiff seeks an order on appeal, for an award of 
substantial attorneys 1 fees to allow her to prosecute this 
matter. That request does not appear to be well taken. 
The Plaintiff in this action, due to problems which are 
not in any way attributable to the Defendant, a subsequent 
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marriage and divorce have alleviated any alimony claim, has, 
after assigning her rights to funds received to the State of 
Utah hired an independent counsel to pursue a modification. 
It should be noted that the State of Utah requested and 
received, on a voluntary basis, an increase in the support 
that Plaintiff was originally awarded. The State of Utah was 
and arguably still is the real party in interest in this 
action and they have chosen to make only a brief appearance 
and will apparently not participate in the appeal taken. The 
State acknowledged that Defendant was current in all support 
obligations and had voluntarily increased his support payment 
to meet the AFDC levels. 
There is no statutory provision in the rules of Court to 
justify the requested award of attorneys' fees. Rule 33(a) of 
the Rules of the Appellant Court, provides that attorneys1 
fees may be ordered on appeal if the appeal is frivolous or 
not well taken. The Defendant in this action makes no 
allegation as to the nature of this appeal but Defendant/ 
Respondent is certainly not guilty of pursuing a frivolous 
action. The Plaintiff/Appe11 ant has not brought before the 
Court a question of the sufficiency of the award of attorneys' 
fees in the lower court and as in the Martinez case (supra) at 
page 72, in our opinion, this matter is not validly before the 
cour t. 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has not ignored his obligations and to the best 
of his ability has met the ongoing living needs of both 
families. The award of the trial court was not one which 
shocks the conscience or shows an abuse of discretion. The 
decision is based on equitable grounds and is within the 
guidelines established in the Third District and this Court 
for payment for support, and the issue of the retirement 
benefit distribution. 
Defendant would ask that the order of the court be 
affirmed in all respects and that each party bear their own 
costs and attorneys1 fees in the prosecution of this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \)0 day of December, 1988. 
J U^jr 
HAROLD R. STEPHENS 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent Raymond Floyd Ostler 
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